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Alcohol/Leisure Complementarity: 
 Empirical Estimates and Implications for Tax Policy 
Sarah E. West and Ian W.H. Parry 
Abstract 
This paper provides a first attempt to estimate the cross-price elasticity between alcoholic 
beverages and leisure, which is critical for assessing how much alcohol taxation might be warranted on 
fiscal grounds. We estimate an Almost Ideal Demand System defined over alcohol, leisure, and other 
goods, using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and other sources. Our results suggest that 
alcohol is a relative complement for leisure over a range of specifications. This implies that the optimal 
alcohol tax may substantially exceed the Pigouvian tax, reinforcing the efficiency case for higher taxation. 
These findings should be viewed as preliminary however, given a number of data and other limitations of 
the analysis.  
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Alcohol/Leisure Complementarity:  
Empirical Estimates and Implications for Tax Policy 
Sarah E. West∗ and Ian W.H. Parry  
1. Introduction 
There are two potentially important economic rationales for alcohol taxes. First is that 
such taxes help mitigate various external costs of alcohol abuse, such as the risks to others posed 
by drunk drivers and the burden on third parties of medical costs from alcohol-related illness. 
The second suggests that, by raising revenue, alcohol taxes reduce the need to rely on other 
taxes, particularly those on labor income, to finance the government’s budget. Ramsey tax theory 
implies that additional taxation of alcohol can be warranted on fiscal grounds if alcohol is a 
relative complement for leisure. 
As regards the first rationale, a number of studies have measured the Pigouvian, or 
externality-correcting, level of alcohol taxes. Although the usual caveats about parameter 
uncertainty apply, a typical estimate is around $70 per gallon, or about three times current 
federal and state taxes of $24 per gallon (see, e.g., Parry et al. 2008 for a recent discussion of the 
evidence).  
The second rationale for alcohol taxes has not really received any attention in prior 
literature, at least in a quantitative sense, so there is no basis for gauging the extent to which the 
optimal tax may differ from the Pigouvian tax. In other words, economists have not attempted to 
estimate the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity, even though it is a critical parameter in the 
Ramsey component of the optimal alcohol tax. It behooves economists to try to estimate this 
elasticity to provide some insight into whether a valid fiscal rationale exists for alcohol taxes.  
This paper provides a first attempt to estimate this elasticity, based on an Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) defined over alcohol, leisure, and other goods and estimated with data 
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and other sources. Although the data are 
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probably as good as we can find, and we believe that we have pushed the methodology as far as 
possible with standard econometric techniques, the confidence intervals we obtain on the 
alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity are nonetheless large. However, over a wide range of model 
specifications, alcohol is a relative complement for leisure over a 95 percent confidence interval, 
and the resulting Ramsey tax is potentially large. In fact, it is quite plausible that the fiscal 
component of the optimal alcohol tax is more important than the Pigouvian component. Thus, the 
adjustments for alcohol/leisure complementarity only serve to reinforce the efficiency case for 
higher alcohol taxes—perhaps substantially. 
Given a number of data and other limitations discussed below, our findings should be 
viewed as suggestive rather than conclusive. Nonetheless, our analysis has value in 
demonstrating the potential empirical importance of the Ramsey tax and in developing an 
econometric methodology that can be refined as the quantity and quality of data improves over 
time. 
 Before outlining our empirical approach and results, we first describe in more detail how 
our paper relates to previous literature on optimal commodity taxes, external costs, and the 
workplace productivity effects of alcohol abuse. We conclude with a discussion of some caveats 
to the case for higher taxes, such as equity issues, the risk that alcohol tax revenues will not be 
used judiciously, and political opposition to alcohol tax reform.  
2. Background 
A. Relation to Optimal Tax Literature 
According to Ramsey tax theory, the optimal tax on a commodity may exceed any level 
warranted on externality grounds if the product is a relatively weak substitute, or complement, 
for leisure compared with other consumption goods (e.g., Sandmo 1975; Bovenberg and Goulder 
2002). Under these conditions, up to a point, a revenue-neutral tax shift from labor income to the 
commodity will (slightly) increase labor supply, inducing an efficiency gain in the tax-distorted 
labor market in addition to any efficiency gain from mitigating the externality. Converse results 
apply if the product is a relatively strong substitute for leisure. 
The fiscal component of the optimal commodity tax implicitly combines two linkages 
with the broader tax system that have been decomposed in the literature on environmental tax 
shifts (e.g., Goulder 1995; Parry and Oates 2000). The first linkage is the revenue-recycling 
effect, or efficiency gain, from using additional commodity tax revenues to reduce distortionary Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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labor taxes. The second is the tax interaction effect, or potential efficiency loss, in the labor 
market from the impact of higher commodity prices on reducing the real returns to work effort, 
thereby discouraging labor supply. For commodities that are relative leisure complements, the 
revenue-recycling effect can dominate the tax-interaction effect (and the latter may even reverse 
sign) implying a net welfare gain from interactions with the tax system and a positive fiscal 
component to the optimal tax.  
Perhaps surprisingly, few economists have attempted to empirically apply the optimal 
commodity tax framework to actual taxes. This may be because economists were initially 
concerned with optimizing over all commodity taxes at once, which is an especially formidable 
challenge.1 Instead, our focus is on only one commodity tax, assuming that the rest of the tax 
system, primarily income and payroll taxes, is collapsed into a single tax on labor income.  
Even for the limited number of commodities traditionally targeted with excise 
taxes⎯primarily tobacco products, transportation fuels, and alcoholic beverages⎯few authors 
have attempted to econometrically estimate the leisure cross-price elasticities that are required to 
assess how much taxation of these commodities might be warranted on fiscal grounds.2 One 
exception is West and Williams (2007), who estimate an AIDS over gasoline, leisure, and other 
goods using household data. They find that gasoline is a relative leisure complement and that the 
overall optimal gasoline tax is around 50 percent larger than the externality-mitigating tax. Our 
estimation in Section 3 follows an approach similar to that in West and Williams (2007). 
 
                                                 
1 This would require reliable estimates of own- and leisure-cross price elasticities for every taxed commodity and 
functional form assumptions that might be unreliable for large price changes. One response to these problems has 
been to limit the focus to broad commodity groups and to the appropriate direction of partial tax reforms (e.g., 
Ahmad and Stern 1984; Madden 1995).  
2 A number of studies include alcohol when estimating commodity demand systems but do not include leisure. See 
Andrikopoulos et al. (1997), Blake and Nied (1997), Browning (1991), Blundell et al. (1993), Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980), Eakins and Gallagher (2003), Fuss and Waverman (1987), Gao et al. (1995), Holm (1995), 
Jones (1989), Nelson and Moran (1995), Taube et al. (1990), and Taube and MacDonald (1991). In fact, very few 
studies estimate leisure cross-price elasticities for any commodity. Diewert and Lawrence (1996) estimate these 
elasticities for motor vehicles, housing, and other goods but not alcohol. Madden (1995) includes both leisure and 
alcohol in a demand system estimated with aggregate time series data for Ireland, though the leisure-cross price 
elasticities are not reported.  
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B. Relation to Health Economics Literature 
In health economics, discussions of optimal alcohol taxes usually focus on the 
externality-correcting tax, leaving aside linkages between this tax and the broader fiscal system. 
The most important component of the Pigouvian tax is the (marginal) external cost imposed by 
drunk drivers. This has been calculated from the (fatal and nonfatal) injury risk that drunk drivers 
pose to others, assuming that the risks to occupants of vehicles driven by intoxicated individuals 
are internal. A portion of various other accident costs, such as property damage and medical 
burdens, are external to the extent that they are borne by insurance companies or the government. 
Another component of external costs is the medical burden on third parties from alcohol-induced 
illness (net of any lifetime medical savings from premature mortality), though these costs appear 
to be minor relative to the drunk driver externality. In computing the Pigouvian tax, road 
accident and illness costs are respectively scaled by the sensitivity of drunk driving and heavy 
drinking to alcohol prices, relative to the price sensitivity of overall alcohol consumption. 
Studies typically put the Pigouvian tax at around 30 percent or more of the pre-tax alcohol price.3 
A large empirical literature also exists on the own-price elasticity for alcohol 
consumption, though this elasticity poses serious measurement challenges (see Cook and Moore 
2000). Most estimates for all alcoholic beverages combined lie between about –0.4 and –1.0 
(elasticities for individual beverages sometimes lie outside of this range).4 The own-price 
elasticity feeds into the Ramsey component of the optimal alcohol tax (see below): the more 
inelastic the demand, the greater the Ramsey tax (assuming alcohol is a relative leisure 
complement), as less erosion of the alcohol tax base occurs in response to higher tax rates.5  
Economists have also estimated the productivity and labor supply effects of alcohol 
consumption, attributing any negative association to the inability of heavy drinkers to 
concentrate on the job or find and retain stable employment (Cook and Moore 2000). As 
                                                 
3 See Manning et al. (1989, 1991), Phelps (1988), Pogue and Sgontz (1989), and Parry et al. (2008). Kenkel (1996) 
estimates a somewhat larger tax when people misperceive the long-term risks from heavy drinking. 
4 Some recent studies include Baltagi and Goel (1990), Baltagi and Griffin (1995), Lee and Tremblay (1992), 
Manning et al. (1995), Manning and Mullahy (1998), Nelson and Moran (1995), Selvanathan (1991), and Yen 
(1994).  
5 On the other hand, a more inelastic demand reduces the externality benefits from a given alcohol tax (though it 
does not affect the Pigouvian tax, if the drunk driver and heavy drinking elasticities are also proportionately 
smaller). 
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discussed below, such a negative alcohol–health–productivity relationship plays a separate and 
reinforcing role in raising the optimal tax above the Pigouvian tax. Some studies find this 
negative association (Mullahy and Sindelar 1991, 1993), but others find a drinker’s bonus, that 
is, a positive association between earnings and alcohol consumption (e.g., Berger and Leigh 
1988; Zarkin et al. 1998), though these results may be biased as earnings are a determinant of 
alcohol consumption.  
Two recent studies address the possibility of endogeneity by estimating reduced-form 
models relating labor market outcomes to alcohol taxes. Although Dave and Kaestner (2002) 
find no evidence that alcohol taxes affect wages, employment, or hours, they express concern 
that specification error may obscure the true relationships. Cook and Peters (2005) attempt to 
avoid this problem by using longitudinal data, which enables them to control for a large set of 
individual-specific characteristics. Their results show a positive relationship between alcohol 
taxes and earnings and support the notion that the drinker’s bonus found by others is due to 
reverse causality given that alcohol is a normal good. 
Because our study focuses on the sensitivity of alcohol consumption with respect to the 
price of leisure (and not the reverse), we avoid the kind of endogeneity problem discussed above, 
but face another if alcohol consumption affects wage. We use instrumental variable techniques to 
address this problem, as discussed below. 
3. Econometric Methodology 
A. Model Specification 
We specify the following AIDS for an individual household, h, defined over three 
“goods,” alcohol (A), leisure (l), and a composite of all other consumption goods (C):6 









j P F p s log log β μ α  ,j, k = alcohol, leisure, other goods 
                                                 
6 The AIDS provides a first-order approximation to any demand system and satisfies the axioms of consumer choice 
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). And unlike certain other demand systems, it does not impose (a) weak separability 
between leisure and consumption goods or (b) homothetic preferences (which implies unitary expenditure 
elasticities for all goods); either of these restrictions could seriously bias estimates of the alcohol/leisure cross-price 
elasticity.  
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In these equations, 
h
j s  is the expenditure share for good j, and F
h is full income (total 
spending on alcohol, leisure, and other goods). 
h
k p  is the price of good k faced by household h, 
and P
h is a unit invariant price index, where  p  j is the mean price for good j over all households. 
h
j α ,  jk μ , and j β  are parameters to be estimated, after  imposing restrictions in (1c), which follow 
because household budget shares sum to unity, and demand functions are homogeneous of 
degree zero in prices and full income and satisfy Slutsky symmetry.7  
In (1d), we allow a vector of household-specific characteristics (age, race, education, and 
so on), indexed by r
h, to affect demand, where ζ j0 and ζ jr are parameters to be estimated and e j
h 
is an error term reflecting unobserved differences in preferences. We also include state fixed 
effects and regional dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) in r
h to account for 
unobserved local factors that might affect alcohol use or work behavior (e.g., liquor laws, 
cultural factors, climate, or job opportunities). 
As discussed below, the Ramsey tax component of the optimal alcohol tax depends on 
the compensated elasticity of alcohol demand with respect to the price of leisure, which is the 
main focus of our estimation.  
 
                                                 
7 We limit the number of goods to three for tractability. The omission of another specific good would bias the 
estimate of our quantity of interest, the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity, if wage’s effect on alcohol consumption 
is correlated with the effect of another specific good’s price on alcohol consumption. 
 Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
7 
B. Data Sources 
(i)  Household data  
Our main data consist of 9,454 household observations from 12 consecutive quarters of 
the CEX from 1996 through 1998. Each quarter, 20 percent of the sample is rotated out and 
replaced by new households; we pool household observations across different quarters.8 The 
CEX Family Interview files include, for each household, spending on alcohol, total spending on 
all goods, number of children, and state of residence.9 Another expenditure file in the CEX 
contains two categories of alcohol spending: (a) beer and wine and (b) all other alcohol (i.e., 
spirits). We attempted to estimate separate elasticities for each category, but results were 
implausible or imprecise, as many households do not consume one of the two categories.10 
In addition, for each household, the Member files include usual weekly work hours, 
occupation, the gross amount of last pay, the duration of the last pay period, age, race, sex, and 
education level (above, equal to, or below high school diploma).11  
We calculate (weekly) spending on the composite good by total expenditure less that on 
alcohol; leisure by a (nonsleep) time endowment of 90 hours per week less work hours (our 
results are not sensitive to other time endowments); and full income by total expenditure plus the 
product of leisure and the net wage. Wages are measured by gross wages from the CEX, 
                                                 
8 Pooling observations enables us to exploit variation over time within households. As mentioned below, we cluster 
by household to correct for any bias resulting from dependence across these observations.  
9 Self-reported alcohol consumption usually understates actual consumption, perhaps by as much as 50 percent 
(Cook and Moore 2000). If underreporting varies with wage, then our estimates of the cross-price elasticity of 
demand will be biased. For example, more prevalent underreporting among high-wage workers will bias the cross-
price estimate downward. However, very little evidence is available on whether the errors across survey respondents 
are additive, proportional, random or systematic, so it is unclear whether, and in what way, underreporting affects 
our results. 
10 Assessing whether any basis exists for differential taxation of individual beverages on externality grounds is very 
difficult because, for example, data on alcohol involvement in traffic accidents is not distinguished by beverage 
class. As for the fiscal rationale, there appears to be some basis for taxing beer more heavily than wine, and wine 
more heavily than spirits (Parry et al. 2008). This is because estimated own-price elasticities for beer are smaller in 
magnitude than for wine, which in turn are smaller than for spirits. In contrast, spirits are taxed most heavily, at 
about $35 per gallon of alcohol, compared with $20 per gallon for beer, and $18 for wine (Parry et al. 2008, Table 
1). 
11 Other data sets commonly used in empirical work on alcohol demand do not contain all the variables we require; 
for example, the National Health Interview Survey excludes wages, and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System excludes both wages and hours worked. 
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corrected for selection bias (see below), and net of federal and state income taxes and earned 
income and child tax credits; effective tax rates for different wage rates were obtained from the 
TAXSIM model of the National Bureau of Economic Research (see Feenberg and Coutts 1993). 
As payroll taxes are partially offset by higher future social security benefits, we do not deduct 
them in our baseline specification, though we do deduct them in one of the sensitivity analysis 
specifications. 
(ii)  Price data  
For the alcohol price, we use the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association 
(ACCRA) cost-of-living index, which lists quarterly average prices for beer, wine, and spirits for 
approximately 300 urban areas. We weight city and town prices by population shares (from the 
2000 Census) to obtain state-level alcohol prices. And to obtain one price of alcohol, we convert 
beer, wine, and spirits prices into prices per liter, and weight them by the average share of each 
beverage in total liters of alcohol consumption. The ACCRA data are also used to obtain a price 
index for the composite good. 
Although often used in the empirical alcohol demand literature, the ACCRA price index 
can be problematic. One issue is that data are collected by members of local chambers of 
commerce and there may be some inconsistency in measurement across states. However, 
measurement errors in alcohol prices are only a concern for the alcohol/leisure cross-price 
elasticity if they are spatially correlated with wages or leisure, which seems unlikely. 
Another problem is that spatial differences in alcohol prices may be collinear with the 
state fixed-effect variables. In our data, state fixed effects absorb a significant portion, but by no 
means all, of the variation in state alcohol prices, as these prices vary across time. The average 
standard deviations of within-state wine, beer, and alcohol prices are 11 percent, 9 percent, and 7 
percent of the within-state price averages, respectively. Minimum and maximum prices within 
states differ, on average, by about $2, $4, and $8, respectively. After these prices are weighted 
and averaged to obtain one price per liter of alcohol, the average within-state standard deviation 
in this price is 8 percent of the average price. Lack of variation in within-state alcohol prices 
does magnify the standard error on the own-price alcohol elasticity, though again this is not a 
primary concern for the alcohol–leisure cross-price elasticity. 
Nonetheless, we also estimate specifications (a) with no fixed effects and (b) with various 
fixed effects alternatives commonly used in the literature, including the proportion of the state 
population in college, the state average temperature, the average cloudy days per year, the 
number of drinking establishments and places of worship per capita, and a dummy variable for Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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whether alcohol sales are permitted on Sundays (to proxy for antidrinking sentiment). In these 
alternative specifications, the confidence interval for the own-price alcohol elasticity is 
somewhat narrower, though that for the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity is only moderately 
affected. In the benchmark estimation, we control for state fixed effects to reduce the possibility 
of omitted variables bias.12  
C. Correcting for Selection Bias and Endogeneity 
Not all household members participate in the labor force, and about half of the 
households in our sample report no alcohol consumption. Following Heckman (1979), we 
attempt to correct for possible selection bias by estimating probits on the discrete choice of 
whether to work and whether to consume alcohol. We then exclude from the second-stage 
estimation those households that do not work and that do not consume alcohol to avoid 
estimation bias when a large number of households are censored (e.g., Shonkwiler and Yen 
1999). More details on these first-stage estimation procedures are provided in the appendix.13 
In the case of labor force participation, we estimate a probit model jointly with a wage 
equation using full information maximum likelihood to generate the selectivity-corrected wage 
for each household for use in estimating the demand system in (1a). In the first-stage estimation, 
we use standard exclusion restrictions from the literature (e.g., the number of children, the 
partner’s earnings, and the unemployment rate). 
For the decision of whether to consume alcohol, we estimate a probit to obtain the 
predicted inverse Mills ratios, denoted 
h
















j e MR P F p r s + + + + + = ∑ ∑ γ β μ ζ ζ ) / log( log 0  
                                                 
12 Some researchers have used state beer taxes to proxy for alcohol prices, but this is also problematic (see Young 
and Bielinska-Kwapisz 2002). In particular, taxes are only a tiny fraction of retail prices, and therefore fail to control 
for spatial differences in transportation, distribution, and other producer costs. We experimented with state- and 
quarter-specific beer tax rates as instruments for alcohol prices, but this rendered the alcohol own-price elasticity 
positive. 
 
13 The usual caveat about problems with using the Heckman correction applies here—only data resulting from a 
natural experiment (with perfect measurement) would yield fully credible solutions to censoring problems. 
Unfortunately no such data exist.  
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where the  j γ s are parameters. However, our exclusion restriction for alcohol 
consumption, whether the individual is over the age of 21, is probably a weak source of 
identification as it involves relatively few households. In the sensitivity analysis, we therefore 
also follow many other studies in the literature by ignoring the discrete choice of alcohol, 
reporting results from system estimation on the noncensored sample.14 
The net-of-tax wage rate might be endogenous if (a) alcohol abuse affects on-the-job 
productivity, (b) there are errors in measuring earnings and hours worked that are correlated, and 
(c) marginal income tax rates vary as earnings vary with hours worked. To obtain consistent 
estimates, we instrument for wages in our benchmark case using the occupation-, state-, and 
gender-specific mean net wage from the entire CEX. Because observations are thin across some 
quarter–occupation–state–gender categories, we use time-invariant wage instruments in our 
baseline specification, but we also report results from using quarter-specific wage instruments. 
The real income term, log(F
h/P
h), may also be endogenous because P
h is a function of 
individual-specific expenditure shares that are also dependent variables. We therefore instrument 
for this term, using an alternative price index obtained by replacing the individual-specific shares 
in equation (1b) with the sample mean shares. Because the instrument is still a function of the 
same ratio of household price to mean price in equation (1b), it is strongly correlated with the 
instrumented variable, but is no longer a function of the dependent variables. 
D. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for data used in our benchmark estimation, that is, for 
working households with positive alcohol purchases. One- and two-adult households each 
consume about two liters of alcohol per week, or about 1–2 percent of household full income, 
and both household types spend about half of their full income on leisure. The average 
selectivity-corrected net wage is $8.09 per hour in the one-adult sample, and $10.98 per hour for 
men and $8.56 per hour for women in the two-adult sample. 
                                                 
14 We also estimated a two-part model with no exclusion restriction, but identification of the self-selection model 
through nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio alone may also be weak as this ratio is linear over certain ranges of 
the index (Vella 1998, p. 135). This estimation also yields a positive (but insignificant) own-price elasticity for 
alcohol; again this casts some doubt on the reliability of our estimate of this elasticity, but is not a major concern for 
the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity. 
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E. Estimation Procedure  
We use three-stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate separate demand systems for one- 
and two-adult households, which enables us to use instrumental variables and generalized least 
squares to account for any error correlation across equations.15 Each adult’s leisure is treated as 
a separate good; thus, the two-adult demand system includes male leisure, female leisure, 
alcohol, and composite consumption. We impose the restrictions in (1a–d) and drop the equation 
for other goods. Household characteristics include members’ age, age squared, race, sex (in one-
adult estimation only), number of children, and education level.16  
We use parameters from the demand system to generate aggregate alcohol demand 
elasticities for one- and two-adult households, and alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticities for one-
adult households and for men and women in two-adult households.17 To obtain a single, own-
price alcohol elasticity, we take a weighted average over those for one- and two-adult 
households, where the weights represent their alcohol consumption. And to obtain a single 
alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity, we first average the male and female elasticities for two-
adult households and then take an alcohol-weighted average over elasticities for one- and two-
adult households. Aggregate labor supply elasticities are calculated in a similar way, weighting 
by hours worked.  
Confidence intervals for elasticities were obtained from a nonparametric bias-corrected 
bootstrap that selects 1,500 random subsamples of the full data set and estimates the corrections 
for selectivity bias and the demand systems using each subsample. We cluster observations by 
household in generating each bootstrap sample, given that observations for the same household 
                                                 
15  We experimented with estimating the system using the generalized method of moments. Such estimation did not 
appreciably change estimates nor improve precision and is more tedious to implement, so we elected to use 3SLS 
(but also report results obtained using two-stage least squares, 2SLS). 
16 We could estimate the full econometric model, including all discrete and continuous choices, with maximum 
likelihood. However, because censoring occurs in both alcohol and leisure demand and because, for either or both 
the male and female in two-adult households we would need to evaluate multiple integrals in the likelihood function, 
this would be computationally intensive given that we bootstrap standard errors. 
17 We calculate elasticities using methods and equations explained in West and Williams (2007). Parameters from 
the system estimation are used to find the derivative of the consumption shares with respect to prices; those 
derivatives involving shares are transformed into derivatives involving quantities; those derivatives are calculated 
for each household, correcting for any corner solutions; and then those derivatives are transformed and aggregated 
into elasticities.  
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A. Econometric Estimates 
(i)  Regression Results  
Tables 2 and 3 report the coefficient estimates for the baseline specification of one- and 
two-adult demand systems, which include the variables described above. Negative coefficients 
on the ln(F/P) terms indicate that for both one- and two-adult households, alcohol and leisure are 
necessities. In one-adult households, the share of leisure increases as wage increases. For two-
adult households, the share of leisure (for either adult) also increases as his or her wage increases 
but decreases as the wage of the other adult in the household increases.19 The effect of male 
wage on alcohol consumption is the strongest of the cross-price relationships estimated here; the 
share of spending devoted to alcohol falls as male wage increases. 
 
(ii)  Baseline Elasticities 
The first row of Table 4 reports elasticity estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals 
for our two-step baseline specification with state fixed effects. Confidence intervals for the 
uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticities are 0.02–0.28 and 0.19–0.39, 
                                                 
18 We also attempted to cluster by state rather than by household, but this worsens the fit on the compensated labor 
supply elasticity and therefore on the difference between it and the cross-price elasticity. The bias-corrected 
bootstrap method is appropriate in cases where the variances vary as a function of the parameters of interest. 
19 When translated into cross-price elasticities using the techniques described in footnote 17 above, these effects 
become more intuitive. As shown below, we find positive wage elasticities of labor supply; an increase in wage 
causes the share of leisure to increase not because households increase leisure hours, but because the decrease in 
leisure hours is proportionally smaller than the wage increase. Similarly, our parameter estimates translate into 
negative cross-price labor supply elasticities: as men’s wage increases, women’s work hours decrease, and as 
women’s wage increases, men’s work hours decrease. 
 Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
13 
respectively, which are consistent with prior estimates in the empirical micro literature (see 
discussions in Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Fuchs et al. 1998).20  
Alcohol is a relative complement for leisure when the (compensated) alcohol/leisure 
cross-price elasticity is less than the compensated labor supply elasticity (see below); it is an 
absolute complement for leisure when the cross-price elasticity is negative. In our baseline 
specification, the cross-price elasticity is –0.09; however, it has a wide confidence interval of –
0.42 to 0.22, underscoring the need for sensitivity analysis in inferring optimal taxes, rather than 
placing too much emphasis on the baseline point estimate. The last column of Table 4 indicates 
that alcohol is at least a relative (if not absolute) leisure complement over a 95 percent 
confidence interval. 
Our baseline estimate of the own-price alcohol elasticity is –1.19, which is on the high 
side relative to earlier literature, though the confidence interval for this elasticity is very wide, 
reflecting limited spatial variation in alcohol prices. Again however, our primary focus is not on 
this elasticity, given that there is reasonable consensus among health economists over a plausible 
range for its magnitude. We also estimate the aggregate expenditure elasticity of demand for 
alcohol at 0.06 (not shown in the table), which is broadly consistent with previous studies.21 
(iii)  Sensitivity Analysis 
The rest of Table 4 presents results under various alternative specifications, such as 
estimation including payroll tax rates, estimation using 2SLS, one-step estimation (with no 
inverse Mills ratio for the discrete choice over whether to consume alcohol), no state fixed 
effects, two alternatives for state fixed effects, no instrument for wages, quarter-specific wage 
instruments, and alternative values for the household time endowment. Results are moderately 
                                                 
20 They are also broadly consistent with labor supply assumptions in tax simulation models, such as Browning 
(1987), Ballard et al. (1985), Ballard (1990), and Goulder and Williams (2003). Even though the uncompensated 
hours worked elasticity for males is typically estimated at close to zero, or slightly negative, estimates of the 
economy-wide elasticity, averaged over hours worked, and participation responses for male and female workers are 
generally positive; this mainly reflects the sizable participation elasticity for secondary workers. Macroeconomic 
studies that attempt to explain aggregate labor supply variation across business cycles, or across different countries, 
find much larger elasticities than the micro studies in the empirical labor literature, though the reasons for this 
discrepancy remain a puzzle (e.g., Prescott 2004). 
21 Recent estimates of expenditure elasticities (averaging over all beverages) include 0.10 in Baltagi and Griffin 
(1995), below 0.10 in Farrel et al. (2003), 0.11 in Lee and Tremblay (1992), 0.25 in Manning et al. (1995), 0.40 in 
Nelson and Moran (1995), 0.18 in Ruhm (1995), 0.89 in Selvanathan (1991), and 0.4 in Yen (1994). 
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sensitive to these specifications; for example, the point estimates for the alcohol/leisure cross 
price elasticities vary between –0.12 and 0.08, though they are all well below the corresponding 
point estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticities. However, in specifications without 
fixed effects or with quarter-specific wage instruments, alcohol is no longer a relative leisure 
complement across the entire 95 percent confidence interval. We incorporate this uncertainty 
into our tax simulations below.Results without state fixed effects demonstrate that state fixed 
effects soak up a good degree of alcohol price variation; own-price elasticities of alcohol demand 
in these specifications are statistically different from zero. 
We believe that the specifications without fixed effects and with time-varying wage 
instruments produce less reliable estimates of the alcohol/leisure elasticity than in our baseline 
case. This is due to the possibility of omitted variable bias in the case of omitted state fixed 
effects, and because the observations needed to construct time-varying wage instruments are 
rather thin across some quarter–state–occupation–gender categories. 
B. Optimal Tax Computations 
(i)  Formula and parameter values 
Parry et al. (2008) integrate a static, utility-based model of externalities from drunk 
driving, and from medical burdens on third-parties from alcohol-induced illness, into a general 
equilibrium model that captures interactions between alcohol taxes and tax distortions in the 
labor market. Based on some straightforward manipulation of eq. (8) in that paper, an 
approximation for the optimal (revenue-neutral) alcohol tax is: 
(3) ≈
*
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tA is a specific tax expressed per gallon of pure alcohol, pA is the pre-tax per-gallon price 
of alcohol, tL is a proportional tax on labor income, ηAA < 0 is the own-price elasticity for 
alcohol,  LL ε  is a labor supply elasticity defined with respect to the net of tax wage or price of Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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leisure,  Al η  is the elasticity of alcohol consumption with respect to the price of leisure, and c 
denotes a compensated (as opposed to uncompensated) elasticity. MEG denotes the marginal 
efficiency gain from recycling a dollar of revenue in labor tax reductions; it is greater the larger 
(a) the (uncompensated) labor supply elasticity and (b) the labor tax wedge. Finally, ρ is the 
reduction in workplace productivity per unit of alcohol consumption, caused by health effects or 
injuries sustained in drunk driver accidents. 
The formula in (3) separates the optimal tax into three components. The first component 
is the Pigouvian tax which, as discussed above, encompasses various external costs of road 
accidents and alcohol-induced illness, scaled by the relative responsiveness of drunk driving and 
heavy drinking to alcohol prices. Following the recent review and synthesis of evidence in Parry 
et al. (2008), we assume that the Pigouvian tax is $68 per alcohol gallon.  
Second is the fiscal component, or Ramsey tax, which is very familiar from the 
theoretical literature on optimal taxes.22 This component can be positive when 
c
LL ε  < 
c
Al η , that is, 
when compensated alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity is smaller than the compensated labor 
supply elasticity, which occurs with 95 percent confidence in our baseline econometric estimates. 
However, given the uncertainty over elasticities in our own estimates and in prior empirical 
literature, we illustrate a wide range of possibilities. For the own-price elasticity for alcohol, we 
consider low, medium, and high values of –0.4, –0.8, and –1.2, respectively, and for the labor 
supply elasticities we consider low values of  LL ε  = 0.10, 
c
LL ε  = 0.20, medium values of  LL ε  = 
0.15, 
c
LL ε  = 0.35, and high values of  LL ε  = 0.30, 
c
LL ε  = 0.60. And based on our own estimates, a 
reasonable range to consider for 
c
Al η  is about –0.4 to 0.3. All elasticities are taken to be constant 
across the relevant range. From Parry et al. (2008), we assume pA = $197 per alcohol gallon, the 
initial alcohol tax tA = $24 per alcohol gallon, and the initial labor tax tL = 0.40; our labor market 
parameters imply MEG = 0.07, 0.11, or 0.25.23 
The last component in (3) is the revenue loss from reduced workplace productivity, 
which is a cost to the government and therefore external to individuals (as opposed to the 
                                                 
22 Ramsey (1927) and Corlett and Hague (1953–54) are the classic contributions to the literature. For some recent 
discussion see Ballard et al. (2005).  
23 Our values for MEG are approximately consistent with estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation for 
financing public goods (e.g., Ballard et al. 1985, Ballard 1990, Wildasin 1984), aside from some caveats noted in 
Section 5 below.  
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reduction in net of tax wages, which is internal to individuals). The effect is multiplied by 1 + 
MEG to account for the efficiency effect from raising the labor tax to make up for the lost 
revenue. Following Parry et al. (2008), we adopt low, medium, and high values of ρ = $12, $93, 
and $174 per alcohol gallon, respectively, which roughly spans the wide range of estimates of 
health/productivity impacts in the (unsettled) empirical literature. Multiplying by  L t MEG) 1 ( + , 
the productivity effect adds anything from $5 to $87 per alcohol gallon to the optimal tax.24  
(ii)  Results 
Figure 1 shows the fiscal component of the optimal alcohol tax relative to the Pigouvian 
tax under a wide variety of parameter scenarios. The three panels correspond to our three sets of 
assumptions about labor supply elasticities; the curves in each panel correspond to our three 
different values for the own-price elasticity of alcohol; and along the horizontal axis in each 
panel, we vary the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity across its assumed range of values. 
The relative size of the fiscal component is highly parameter sensitive, varying from 
slightly negative, in the extreme right of panel (a), to more than five times the Pigouvian tax. 
Clearly, more empirical estimates of the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity are needed to pin 
down a narrower, plausible range for this parameter, and hence the optimal alcohol tax. 
Nonetheless, Figure 1 illustrates the potential importance of this issue. For most parameter 
combinations, the curves lie above unity, implying that the fiscal component of the optimal tax 
exceeds the Pigouvian component.  
 Finally, Table 5 illustrates the absolute values of the three components of the optimal 
alcohol tax under alternative scenarios. Under medium values for all parameters, the optimal 
alcohol tax is $246 per alcohol gallon, an order of magnitude larger than the current tax; the 
Pigouvian, fiscal, and productivity components account for 28 percent, 56 percent, and 16 
percent, respectively, of this optimal tax. In a couple of cases, the fiscal component is relatively 
modest, or even negative—namely, when the labor supply elasticities take their medium or low 
values and the own-price alcohol and alcohol leisure cross price elasticities are large. But in the 
                                                 
24 The formula in (3) is an approximation as it excludes from the fiscal component changes in the government 
budget resulting from changes in spending on medical care and implementation of drunk driver penalties. In Parry et 
al. (2008), these budgetary impacts are small relative to the marginal change in alcohol tax revenues.  
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seven other parameter combinations illustrated in Table 5, the fiscal component is anything from 
around $70 per gallon to more than $400 per gallon.  
5. Conclusion 
Although implementation of a fully optimized set of taxes on all commodities is probably 
impractical, existing commodity taxes, primarily on alcohol, cigarettes, and transportation fuels, 
are frequently justified on revenue-raising grounds. It therefore behooves economists to assess 
what level of these taxes might be appropriate on fiscal grounds, even though estimates are 
always likely to be imprecise given the difficulty of accurately pinning down the own- and cross-
price elasticities required to compute optimal tax rates.  
This paper provides a first attempt to econometrically estimate the alcohol/leisure cross-
price elasticity. We find that alcohol is a relative complement for leisure over 95 percent 
confidence intervals in many (though not all) specifications. Plugging a range of values for the 
alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity into an optimal tax formula, we find that the Ramsey tax 
component is potentially very large, and quite plausibly exceeds the Pigiouvian tax. Given that 
Pigouvian tax estimates are well above current alcohol tax levels, fiscal considerations appear to 
substantially reinforce the case for raising alcohol taxes.  
We are at pains to emphasize the preliminary nature of these findings, however. The 
confidence intervals on the alcohol/leisure cross-price elasticity are large, so we cannot, given 
current data availability and quality, pin down the Ramsey tax with accuracy. We hope that the 
methodology we have laid out, along with the importance of the issue for alcohol policy, will 
stimulate future empirical investigations and narrow the range of uncertainty over the size of the 
Ramsey tax. 
We conclude with some broader caveats related to the efficiency case for higher alcohol 
taxes. One caveat concerns household equity. Alcohol taxes are regressive, even when household 
income is measured on a lifetime—rather than annual—basis (e.g., Lyon and Schwab 1995).25 
Some economists would favor disaggregating different income groups in optimal tax analyses 
                                                 
25 This finding might be weakened somewhat if one took full account of (a) automatic indexing of tax and benefit 
thresholds following an increase in the consumer price level, (b) the recycling of alcohol tax revenues, and (c) 
externality benefits from improved health and fewer drunk driver accidents. 
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and incorporating distributional weights. This would lower the optimal alcohol tax, though by 
how much is unclear as society’s aversion to income inequality is difficult to measure 
empirically. Others, however, argue for addressing distributional concerns by adjusting the 
broader tax and benefit system to provide a reasonable safety net. In this view, higher alcohol 
taxes should not necessarily be resisted on distributional grounds, though recycling of revenues 
might be skewed toward to the poor. 
Another worry is that additional revenues from alcohol taxes may end up being wasted in 
special interest spending, rather than being used to substitute for other taxes. This is a legitimate 
concern given how Congress appears to have used new revenue sources in the past (Becker and 
Mulligan 2003). But in principle, this problem can be avoided if the political will is there. 
Legislation accompanying the alcohol tax increase can specify an automatic and offsetting 
reduction in other taxes, thereby eliminating the possibility of new funding for special interests. 
Clearly, there is strong political opposition to higher alcohol taxes, not least from the 
brewing and hospitality industries. In other policy contexts, such as most existing legislative 
proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, adversely affected producer groups are partially 
compensated—for example, producers might receive a free allocation of permit allowances with 
market value, though the compensation would be phased out over time. In principle, some 
temporary tax relief might also be provided to beverage interests, though at the expense of 
lowering the efficiency gains from the hike in alcohol taxes. Moreover, public health groups 
would probably oppose any such compensation. 
A related point is that alcohol taxes are mostly levied on a per-unit basis, requiring 
frequent increases in the nominal rate to prevent erosion of their revenue-raising capacity by 
inflation. Such adjustments are politically difficult, as evidenced by the decline in alcohol taxes 
from 50 percent of pre-tax prices in 1970 to 12 percent now (Kenkel 1996). Besides raising the 
overall level of taxation, a case could also be made for converting taxes to an ad valorem basis to 
prevent progressive erosion in the real tax rate over time.  
Our analysis focuses on alcohol in isolation, though in practice the demand for cigarettes 
is probably affected by alcohol prices. The implications for the optimal alcohol tax are unclear, 
however, as empirical work on whether alcohol and cigarettes are complements or substitutes is 
unsettled (e.g., Decker and Schwartz 2000), as is literature on whether cigarettes are currently 
under- or overtaxed (cf. Gruber 2002 and Viscusi 2002).  
Finally we note that, by ignoring some broader distortions created by the tax system, our 
discussion may significantly understate the optimal alcohol tax. Income taxes distort the choice Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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between ordinary spending and tax-preferred spending, such as employer-provided medical 
insurance and owner-occupied housing. Accounting for these distortions raises the efficiency 
gains from recycling excise tax revenues in income tax reductions, implying a higher optimal 
commodity tax (Parry and Bento 2000). Similarly, the efficiency gains from revenue recycling, 
and the optimal level of commodity taxation, can also be greater when one allows for the 
distortionary effect of income taxes on depressing capital accumulation below economically 
efficient levels (Bovenberg and Goulder 1997).  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Working Households with Positive Alcohol Consumption 






Weekly alcohol consumption (liters)  2.08  2.80  2.11  2.84 
One-adult weekly work hours  40.5  11.4  -  - 
Two-adult male weekly work hours  -  -  44.9  10.2 
Two-adult female weekly work hours  -  -  37.6  11.3 
Share of alcohol expenditure in full income
  0.02 0.03  0.007  0.01 
One-adult share of leisure in full income  0.49  0.15  -  - 
Two-adult male share of leisure in full income
  - -  0.28  0.08 
Two-adult female share of leisure in full income
  - -  0.25  0.08 
Share of composite good in full income
  0.50 0.16  0.46 0.13 
Weighed alcohol price ($/liter)  5.84  0.44  5.83  0.45 
Price of composite good (index)  1.04  0.10  1.03  0.11 
One-adult Heckman-corrected net hourly wage ($)
  8.09 2.42  -  - 
Two-adult male Heckman-corrected net hourly wage ($)
  - -  10.98  3.29 
Two-adult female Heckman-corrected net hourly wage ($)
  - -  8.56  2.20 
Weekly full income ($)  879.7  413.6  1858.6  728.1 
One-adult age (years)  37.3  11.70  -  - 
Two-adult male age (years)  -  -  38.4  9.9 
Two-adult female age (years)  -  -  36.9  9.4 
One-adult education: < high school diploma (%)  8.5  -  -  - 
One-adult education: high school diploma (%)  23.9  -  -  - 
One-adult education: > high school diploma (%)  67.6  -  -  - 
Two-adult male education: < high school diploma (%)  -  -  8.7  - 
Two-adult male education: high school diploma (%)  -  -  27.9  - 
Two-adult male education: > high school diploma (%)  -  -  63.4  - 
Two-adult female education: < high school diploma (%)  -  -  7.3  - 
Two-adult female education: high school diploma (%)  -  -  26.3  - 
Two-adult female education: > high school diploma (%)  -  -  66.3  - 
Race of household head          
White (%)  87.8  -  87.6  - 
Black (%)  14.7  -  8.6  - 
Asian (%)  0.6  -  .8  - 
Other race (%)  2.9  -  3.0  - Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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Number of children  0.42  0.88  1.17  1.19 
Region        
Northeast (%)  15.4  -  13.4  - 
Midwest (%)  23.0  -  25.4  - 
South (%)  34.0  -  35.7  - 
West (%)  27.5  -  25.4  - 
Observations 3395  -  3242  - 
 
Table 2: One-Adult Household Demand System Estimation Results (Baseline) 
  Alcohol Share  Leisure Share 
 
ln(alcohol price)  -0.0012  -0.0066 
 (0.0335)  (0.0062) 
 
ln(other good price)  0.0077  -0.0808*** 
 (0.0354)  (0.0352) 
 
ln(net wage)  -0.0066  0.0874*** 
 (0.0062)  (0.0343) 
 
ln(F/P) -0.0152***  -0.3504*** 
 (0.0036)  (0.0282) 
 
Inverse Mills Ratio (alcohol)  0.0088  -0.3275 
 (0.0896)  (0.5013) 
 
Age   -0.0006  -0.0037 
 (0.0006)  (0.0042) 
 
Age Squared   0.000007  0.00004 
 (0.000007)  (0.00005) 
 
Black -0.0024  0.0137 
 (0.0054)  (0.0360) 
 
Asian -0.0065  0.0084 
 (0.0118)  (0.0927) 
 
Other Race  -0.0010  0.0222 
 (0.0051)  (0.0359) 
 
High School Degree  0.0016  0.0430* 
 (0.0036)  (0.0256) 
 
More than High School Degree  0.0002  0.0495 Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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 (0.0055)  (0.0367) 
 
Female 0.0008  0.0116 
 (0.0015)  (0.0182) 
 
Number of Children  0.0005  0.0033 
 (0.0012)  (0.0073) 
 
Constant 0.1314***  2.8864*** 
 (0.0657)  (1.467) 
 
Number of Observations  3395  3395 
Notes. These 3SLS regressions use ln(mean net wage by occupation, by state and gender) instruments for ln(net 
wage) and ln(F/P) calculated using the price index based on mean expenditure shares as instruments for the ln(F/P), 
using individual-specific shares. All regressions include state and region dummy variables. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent (***) or 10 percent (*) level.  
 
Table 3: Two-Adult Household Demand System Estimation Results (Baseline) 
  Alcohol Share  Male Leisure  Female Leisure  
 
ln(alcohol price)  -0.0021  -0.0039***  -0.0011 
 (0.0042)  (0.0015)  (0.0016) 
 
ln(other good price)  0.0071***  -0.067***  -0.0464*** 
 (0.0035)  (0.0164)  (0.0110) 
 
ln(male net wage)  -0.0039***  0.1455***  -0.0746*** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0137)  (0.0074) 
 
ln(female net wage)  -0.0011  -0.0746***  0.1221*** 
 (0.0016)  (0.0074)  (0.0087) 
 
ln(F/P) -0.0070***  -0.169***  -0.1684*** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0305)  (0.0230) 
 
Inverse Mills Ratio (alcohol)  -0.0063  0.2858  0.2690 
 (0.0212)  (0.3286)  (0.2450) 
 
Male Age  0.0003  -0.0043  -0.0018 
 (0.0003)  (0.0027)  (0.0019) 
 
Male Age Squared  -0.000004  0.00005*  0.00002 
 (0.000003)  (0.00003)  (0.00002) 
 
Black Male  -0.0002  -0.0170  -0.0331 
 (0.0029)  (0.0533)  (0.0416) 
 -0.0046*  0.0304  0.0066 Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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Asian Male 
 (0.0025)  (0.0445)  (0.0352) 
 
Other Race Male  -0.0005 -0.0094  0.0179 
 (0.0019)  (0.0343)  (0.0250) 
 
Male High School Degree  0.0012  -0.0077  -0.0075 
 (0.0017)  (0.0214)  (0.0170) 
 
Male More than High School Degree  0.0015  -0.0091  -0.0089 
 (0.0018)  (0.0217)  (0.0153) 
 
Female Age  -0.0001  0.0017  -0.0017 
 (0.0002)  (0.0022)  (0.0019) 
 
Female Age Squared  0.000001  -0.00001  0.00003 
 (0.000003)  (0.00003)  (0.00002) 
 
Black Female  0.0008  0.0196  0.0261 
 (0.0030)  (0.0544)  (0.0421) 
 
Asian Female  -0.0004  -0.033  -0.0412 
 (0.0037)  (0.0618)  (0.0445) 
 
 










 (0.0021)  (0.0367)  (0.0288) 
 
Female High School Degree  -0.0011  -0.0071  0.0002 
 (0.0014)  (0.0154)  (0.0128) 
 
Female more than High School Degree  -0.0019  -0.005  0.008 
 (0.0014)  (0.0149)  (0.0127) 
 
Number of Children  0.0001  -0.0007  0.0074 
 (0.0002)  (0.0036)  (0.0028) 
 
Constant 0.0756*  1.1901*  1.2493* 
 (0.0432)  (0.6499)  (0.6684) 
 
Observations 3242  3242  3242 
Notes: These 3SLS regressions use ln(mean net wage by occupation, by state and gender) instruments for ln(net wage) and 
ln(F/P) calculated using the price index based on mean expenditure shares as instruments for the ln(F/P) using individual-
specific shares. All regressions include state and region dummy variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent (***) or 10 percent (*) level. 
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uncomp. comp. comp. alcohol/ own-price
labor supply labor supply leisure cross-      alcohol
elasticity elasticity price elast. elasticity
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B)-(C)
(1) Baseline 0.12 0.25 -0.09 -1.19 0.34
(0.02, 0.28) (0.19, 0.39) (-0.42, 0.22) (-2.69, 2.41) (0.08, 0.73)
Alternative Spefications
(2) Including payroll taxes 0.14 0.25 -0.09 -1.25 0.34
(-0.05, 0.47) (0.12, 0.57) (-0.37, 0.22) (-2.78, 2.03) (0.06, 0.81)
(3) Two-stage least squares  0.15 0.27 -0.09 -0.69 0.37
(-0.12, 0.28) (0.02, 0.38) (-0.37, 0.22) (-1.73, 3.61) (0.05, 0.67)
(4) 0.20 0.30 -0.08 -1.11 0.38
(-0.03, 0.43) (0.15, 0.47) (-0.28, 0.11) (-1.76, -0.51) (0.14, 0.66)
(5) 0.17 0.27 0.08 -1.21 0.19
(-0.11, 0.24) (0.11, 0.35) (-0.32, 0.17) (-3.88, -0.55) (-0.16, 0.57)
(6) 0.16 0.26 0.06 -1.20 0.21
(-0.07, 0.38) (0.12, 0.44) (-0.29, 0.38) (-3.57, -0.46) (-0.16, 0.61)
(7) 0.14 0.25 0.08 -1.15 0.18
(-0.11, 0.35) (0.08, 0.45) (-0.24, 0.43) (-3.71, -0.48) (-0.21, 0.54)
(8) 0.18 0.30 -0.12 -0.92 0.43
(-0.11, 0.24) (0.11, 0.35) (-0.32, 0.17) (-2.80, 1.70) (0.10, 0.62)
(9) Quarter-specific wage instruments 0.13 0.25 -0.002 -1.35 0.25
(-0.10, 0.31) (0.07, 0.41) (-0.64, 0.73) (-4.59, 0.30) (-0.50, 1.01)
(10) 0.21 0.30 -0.09 -1.14 0.39
(0.04, 0.30) (0.20, 0.34) (-0.42, 0.25) (-2.68, 2.56) (0.07, 0.82)
(11) 0.13 0.26 -0.09 -1.24 0.35
(-0.07, 0.31) (0.09, 0.43) (-0.40, 0.21) (-2.67, 2.10) (0.07, 0.76)
Notes
a Baseline but replacing state fixed effects with percentage of state population in college, an indicator equal to one if alcohol sales are 
allowed on Sundays, and state’s number of cloudy days per year. Results are essentially the same if number of cloudy days
 is replaced with state's average temperature.
b  Specification 6, but adding number of drinking establishments (liquor stores and drinking places) per capita and number of 
places of worship per capita.
Time endowment reduced to 84 hours
Time endowment increased to 112 hours
Table 4. Estimated Elasticities
(figures in parentheses show 95% confidence intervals)
Fixed effects alternative 2
b
No state fixed effects
Fixed effects alternative 1
a
No instruments for wages
























labor supply optimal 
elasticities tax alc./leisure cross-price -0.15 -0.05 0.2
components own price -0.6 -0.8 -1
productivity effect high medium low
Pigouvian 68 68 68
low fiscal 201 71 -5
productivity 74 40 5
total 343 179 68
Pigouvian 68 68 68
medium fiscal 395 137 22
productivity 77 41 5
total 541 246 95
Pigouvian 68 68 68
high fiscal >500 318 78
productivity 87 47 6
total >655 433 152
Table 5. Optimal Alcohol Taxes Under Different Parameter Assumptions
alcohol elasticities and productivity effects
($ per gallon of pure alcohol)
Table 5. Optimal Alcohol Taxes under Different Parameter Assumptions 
($ per gallon of pure alcohol) Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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Figure 1. Fiscal Component of Optimal Alcohol Tax under Different Parameter Assumptions 
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Appendix: Corrections for Selection Bias 
Alcohol purchase decision. For our benchmark estimation, inverse Mills ratios (
h
a MR ) were 
obtained from estimating probit models for one- and two-adult households on the choice of whether 
to consume alcohol. Each probit includes the age; age squared; race; marital status; number of 
children; region; and the logs of the alcohol price, composite good price, and spending on the 
composite. We use less than 21 years of age as our exclusion restriction given the absence of a 
better determinant of the discrete choice that does not affect the continuous choice of alcohol. 
Labor force participation decision. For the first-stage choice of whether to work, we jointly 
estimate a probit and a net wage equation using full information maximum likelihood separately for 
one- and two-adult households and, within those samples, separately for men and for women. The 
one-adult probits include age, age squared, education, race, marital status, number of children, 
region, the log of alcohol price, the log of other good price, and state-specific quarterly 
unemployment rates; the two-adult probits also contain partner’s earnings and demographic 
information. 
Because we use a linear approximation to the price index, wages affect the price derivatives 
of demand even for nonworkers (though this effect is minimal), and thus we need to predict wages 
for nonworkers as well as for workers. And because occupation is an important determinant of net 
wage but is observed only for workers, we run two selection models for each subsample, one to 
estimate workers’ net wages and the other to estimate nonworkers’ net wages. Within each 
subsample (where one such subsample, for example, is composed of women from one-adult 
households), both of the selection models use the same set of observations of workers and 
nonworkers and identical probits. To estimate net wages for nonworkers, we specify a wage 
equation that includes education, age, age squared, race, marital status, region, and the inverse Mills 
ratio from the probits; and to estimate net wages for workers, we include those same variables as 
well as occupation indicators. Because net wages are distributed log normal, we define the 
dependent variable as the log of net wage. We calculate predicted net wages for workers to include 
in demand system estimation. 
In principle, the Heckman selection model is identified even when the variables in the probit 
and the wage regression are the same. In that case, the model is identified by its functional form and 
the normality assumption. Note, however, that the probits include number of children, the log of 
alcohol price, the log of the other good price, state-specific quarterly unemployment rates, and, in 
the case of two-adult households, partner’s earnings; the wage equations do not include these 
variables. The number of children affects the fixed cost of working and thus the participation Resources for the Future  West and Parry 
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decision. But we do not expect the number of children to affect the wage because we control for 
age, race, and gender; the number of children is a standard exclusion restriction in the labor supply 
literature.  
Our demand system allows alcohol and other good prices to affect the continuous demand 
for leisure, and thus it is reasonable to assume that they also affect the discrete work choice. 
Although high-price regions may also be high-wage regions, we find no reason to postulate that an 
individual facing a high alcohol price or other good price will have a higher wage because we 
control for region in our wage equation. Unemployment rates serve as a proxy for job availability in 
a state and thus affect the likelihood of working, but it is not clear why they would affect wages. 
Partner’s earnings serve as a proxy for an individual’s nonwage income, but should not directly 
affect an individual’s wage; this is another standard exclusion restriction. 
 
 
 